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Social and Political Transformations in the Middle East	  
Umit	  Kurt	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  Oguz	  Alyanak
Months	  ago,	  the	  spark	  that	  set	  the	  body	  of	  a	  young	  vendor	  set	  Tunisia	  in	  Kire,	  which	  spread	  all	  over	  North	  Africa	  
and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  “Mohammed	  Bouazizi	  was	  the	  man	  who	  set	  himself	  and	  Tunisia	  on	  Kire”,	  according	  to	  the	  
TIME	  magazine.1	  (TIME,	  January	  21,	  2011).	  His	  self-­‐immolation	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  what	  we	  speak	  of	  today	  as	  
the	  Arab	  Spring.	  	  	  
The	  Arab	  world	  has	   been	  experiencing	   an	   inevitable	   chain	  of	  social	   and	   political	  movements	   that	   started	   in	  
early	  2011.	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  long	  period	  of	  inertia	  and	  apathy	  that	  pervaded	  the	  Arab	  world	  has	  come	  to	  an	  
end.	  And	  this	  belief	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  we	  carry	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  on	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  to	  this	  edition	  of	  our	  
newsletter.	   Today,	   thanks	   to	  Mohammed	  Bouazizi,	   we	  can	  speak	  of	  courageous	  of	  crowds	  of	   the	  Arab	  world,	  
from	  Tunis	  to	  Tahrir	  Square,	  from	  Yemen	  to	  Bahrain	  to	  Benghazi	  and	  Tripoli.2	  What	  we	  continue	  to	  witness	  is	  
truly	  revolutionary,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  new	  order	  of	  freedom	  is	  emerging	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.3	  	  	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  uprisings	  have	  been	  ignited	  in	  all	  countries	  having	  similar	  economic	  hardship	  and	  absence	  
of	  civil	   and	  political	  rights,	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  the	  uprisings	  to	  lead	  to	  similar	  changes	   in	  all	  countries.4	  We	  
can	  already	   speak	  of	  three	  different	  patterns	   underlying	  the	  motives	  of	  resistance.	   In	  Tunisia	   and	  Egypt,	   the	  
presidents	  have	  been	  ruled	  out	  by	  members	  of	  their	  own	  regime,	  including	  the	  military;	  they	  are	  now	  trying	  to	  
limit	  the	  extent	  of	  change	  and	  to	  transform	  a	  potentially	  revolutionary	  process	  into	  one	  of	  reform	  from	  the	  top.	  
In	  Yemen	  and	  Libya,	   the	  challenge	  to	  the	  leaders	  has	  transformed	  into	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  state	  
itself: the two countries have no institutions	  that	  can	  persist	  if	  the	  presidents	  are	  ousted.	  In	  other	  countries	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affected	  by	  protests,	  the	  regimes	  have	  been	  trying	  
to	   quash	   the	   protesters	   through	   a	   mixture	   of	  
populist	  concessions,	  cautious	  reforms	  introduced	  
from	  the	  top,	  and	  the	  occasional	  use	  of	  force.5
	  	  
Until	   very	   recently,	   it	   was	   often	   argued	   that	   the	  
political	  options	  for	  the	  Arab	  world	  in	  the	  possible	  
aftermath	   of	   the	   Arab	   Spring	   were	   limited	   to	  
three:	  First,	  the	  persistence	  of	  corrupt	  autocracies	  
as	   in	   Egypt	   and	   Libya,	   or	   royal	   dynasties	   as	   in	  
Saud i	   Arab ia	   and	   Jo rdan ;	   s econd ,	   the	  
establishment	   of	   “Islamic	   fundamentalisms”	   and	  
third,	   strengthening	   of	   al-­‐Qaeda’s	   “terrorism”,	  
which	   was	   sometimes	   thrown	   into	   the	   same	  
basket	  as	  Islamic	  fundamentalism.6	  What	  this	  kind	  
of	  assessment	  could	  not	  foresee	   is	   the	  emergence	  
of	  a	  movement	  of	  mass	  democratic	   resistance	  that	  
is	  utterly	  modern	  in	  its	  understanding	  of	  politics.	  
The	   uprisings	   in	   the	   Arab	  world	  were	   explained	  
through	   two	   determinants,	   economic,	   with	   mass	  
unemployment,	   rising	   prices,	   scarcity	   of	  essential	  
commodities	   and	   political,	   cronyism,	   corruption,	  
repression,	   and	   torture.	   Egypt	   and	   Saudi	   Arabia	  
played	   pivotal	   roles	   for	   the	   sustenance	   of	   U.S.	  
hegemony	   in	  the	  region,	   as	   conKirmed	  recently	  by	  
U.S.	   vice-­‐president	   Joe	  Biden,	   who	   stated	   that	   he	  
was	  more	  concerned	  about	  Egypt	  than	  Libya.7	  The	  
mass	   movement	   remains	   intact	   in	   both	   Tunisia	  
and	   Egypt	   but	   is	   also	   short	   of	   the	   political	  
instruments	  that	  reKlect	  the	  general	  will.8	  As	  Tarıq	  
Ali	   keenly	   puts,	   “the	   Kirst	   phase	   is	   over	   and	  
the	   second,	   that	   of	   rolling	   back	   the	   movements,	  
has	  begun”.	  
	  
At	   this	   point,	   it	   is	   also	   crucial	   to	   touch	   upon	   the	  
role	   and	   effect	   of	   Turkey	   in	   the	   region.	   Clearly,	  
Turkey’s	  foreign	  policy	  of	  engaging	  with	  different	  
governments	   and	   political	   groups	   in	   the	   Arab	  
world	   has	   had	   a	   transforming	   impact	   on	  Middle	  
Eastern	   politics	   and	   economy.	   The	   Turkish	  
position	   on	   change,	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   Foreign	  
Minister’s	   “zero	   problems	  with	   neighbors”	  policy	  
has	  been	  clear	  all	  along.	   Change	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  
is	   inevitable	   and	   must	   reKlect	   people’s	   legitimate	  
demands	  for	  justice,	   freedom	  and	  prosperity.	  And	  
change	   must	   come	   without	   violence.	   While	   the	  
Arab	  Spring	  moves	  at	  different	  speeds	   in	  different	  
countries,	   Turkey	   continues	   to	   urge	   Arab	  
governments	  for	  genuine	  reform.	  
A	  new	  and	  democratic	  era	  will	  give	  the	  Arab	  world	  
a	  chance	  to	  be	  the	  masters	  of	  their	  own	  destiny.	   It	  
will	   also	   enable	   the	   people	   to	   develop	   a	   new	  
paradigm	   for	   their	   relationship	   with	   the	   West	  
based	   on	   equality	   and	   partnership	   –	   a	   position	  
Turkey	  has	  come	  to	   symbolize	  under	   its	  reformed	  
foreign	  policy.	   As	   the	   foreign	  minister	   of	  Turkey,	  
Ahmet	   Davutoglu,	   pointed	   out,	   “Turkey’s	  
institutional	   and	   intellectual	   help	   in	   enabling	   the	  
transition	   to	   democracy	   in	   Arab	   world	   are	  
indispensable	  parameters	  for	  democratic	  future	  of	  
the	   region.”9	   Although	   there	   remains	   numerous	  
ambiguities	  about	  what	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  region,	  
what	   has	   emerged	   in	   the	   Arab	   world	   is	   a	  
thoroughly	  modern	  mass	  democratic	  movement	  in	  
political	  terms.	  
Arab	   revolutionaries	   are	   struggl ing	   for	  
“democratic	   freedoms,	   a	   free	   public	   sphere,	   and	  
joining	   the	   contemporary	  world	   after	   decades	   of	  
lies,	   isolation	  and	  deception.”10	   But	   in	  both	  cases,	  
transformative	   hopes	   remain	   feeble:	   the	   political	  
and	   economic	   order	   in	   these	   countries	   of	  
resistance	  is	  fragile	  and	  susceptible	  to	  change.
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The	   articles	   that	   are	   collected	   from	   graduate	   students	   and	   experts	   on	   the	   topics	   discussed	   provide	  
different	  perspectives	  to	  evaluating	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  We	  hope	  you	  enjoy	  reading	  them.	  And	  as	  always,	  we	  
are	  looking	  forward	  to	  hearing	  your	  feedback	  on	  the	  discussion.
All THE BEST, 
UMIT KURT AND OGUZ ALYANAK
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The Political Economy of Turkey’s 
Response to the Arab Spring
Altay Atlı*
The uprisings in the Arab world proved to be a tough 
trial for Turkey’s new foreign policy  paradigm based 
on the principle of “zero problems with neighbors” 
and complicated its vision of becoming a key  player, 
if not outright leader, in the region. Before the 
demonstrations rocked the Arab world, the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) government had been 
winning “hearts and minds” throughout the Middle 
East thanks to its firm stand on the Palestinian issue 
as well as its efforts to solve problems in Lebanon, 
Syria, and Iraq. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan was hailed as a hero who “taught a lesson to 
Israel,” at the same time Turkey was lifting visa 
requirements and expanding economic relations with 
the countries in the region. The Arab world was 
praising the “Turkish model” of democratic progress 
in a predominantly Muslim society  as a blueprint for 
its own road to development. 
The pro-democracy  movement in Egypt provided an 
opportunity for Turkey to promote its own “model”. 
Erdoğan did not lose time in demanding the Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak to “heed the desires of the 
people” and to “step down”.1 The role that Turkey 
had tailored for itself in the Middle East implied the 
promotion of democratic change in the region and the 
response to Tahrir Square was in perfect accordance 
with this vision.
The real challenge for Erdoğan and his government, 
however, came with Libya. In stark contrast to its 
response to the movement in Egypt  — and despite the 
fact that compared with Egypt the uprising in Libya 
led to greater oppression and brutality —  Turkey 
hesitated to take a clear stance against the Libyan 
leader Muammar Qaddafi. Ankara’s cautionary 
approach to the events unfolding in Libya was 
attributed to the existence of more than 25 thousand 
Turkish citizens living in Libya, mostly  workers and 
engineers employed by Turkish construction 
companies, as the government’s priority  was said to 
be ensuring the safety of its citizens. 
Turkey strongly opposed a NATO intervention 
against Libya on the grounds that it  would be 
“counter productive” and demanded that change be 
brought to Libya not  through external interference, 
but from within.2 The interesting point is that for 
Ankara, Qaddafi remained in the picture until keeping 
him there was no longer possible. Erdoğan, who had 
asked Mubarak to listen to the people and to go, said 
in an interview about Qaddafi that he “expected the 
Libyan leader to take positive steps” one of which 
would be to appoint a new head of the state “of his 
choice.”3 It was only more than two months after the 
outbreak of unrest in Libya that Ankara decided to 
dump Qaddafi. In early May, Erdoğan said that 
instead of heeding his government’s calls, Qaddafi 
preferred to shed blood and there was nothing more 
to say in Libya: Qaddafi had to go. 
The contrast between Turkey’s responses to the 
events in Egypt and Libya raises questions about 
Turkey’s self-fashioned role as the promoter of 
democratic change in the Middle East. With regard to 
Egypt, Ankara had an uncompromisingly pro-
democratic stance. In the Libyan case, the response 
was rather delayed, which appeared as an effort to 
gain time in order to find a compromise between the 
establishment, i.e. Qaddafi and the democratic 
forces.The most common explanation for this unclear 
position referred to the economic involvement of 
Turkey in the region. It was argued that, while 
Turkey’s trade and investment relations with Egypt 
were minimal, in Libya it had a significant economic 
existence that needed to be protected. Therefore
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Ankara could not part easily with Qaddafi, under 
whose rule Turkish business in Libya had soared, as 
easily as it did with Mubarak. 
This argument implies that Turkey’s pursuit  of 
democratic norms and ideals in the region is little 
more than rhetoric, which only lasts as long as 
material benefits are preserved. While from a purely 
realist and pragmatic perspective, this line could have 
made sense, it nevertheless creates a false dichotomy 
between the support for democracy and the 
capitalistic pursuit of profits, which hinders a fuller 
understanding of why Turkey’s responses to Egypt 
and Libya differed so drastically. This essay proposes 
a political economy approach that escapes the limits 
of this simplistic dichotomy by  focusing on the 
interrelation between ideational and material factors 
determining Turkey’s response in both cases. 
In order to discuss the material side of the picture, we 
need to locate both Libya and Egypt in the geo-
economic map  of Turkey’s foreign economic 
relations. According to the data released by Turkish 
Statistics Institute, Turkey’s trade with Libya totaled 
2.4 billion dollars in 2010, while its trade volume 
with Egypt in the same period was 3.2 billion dollars.
4 On the other hand, according to Turkish Treasury 
data, over the ten-year period between 2000 and the 
end of 2009, Libya received a capital flow of 51.8 
million dollars from Turkey, while the figure for the 
Turkish capital received by  Egypt over the same 
period was 68.6 million dollars.5 Both trade and 
investment figures point to a greater weight for 
Egypt, however the real story lies somewhere else. 
Construction services are the backbone of the Turkish 
economy, employing 1.4 million people and 
accounting for 6 percent of Turkey’s GDP. In 2010, 
when Turkey’s economy expanded by 8.9 percent, 
construction was one of the main drivers of growth, 
as the sector grew by 17.1 percent in one year.6 This 
growth was mainly derived from activities overseas. 
Over almost four decades up until the end of 2010, 
Turkish contractors have undertaken more than six 
thousand projects in 89 countries, with a total value 
of 188 billion dollars. Libya is the second largest 
market for Turkish contractors; they have been active 
there since the early 1970s and the total value of the 
529 projects they have completed so far is 26.4 
billion dollars, of which nearly the half has been 
realized over the last five years.7 The construction 
industry has also spillover effects on trade, as the 
bulk of Turkey’s exports to Libya consist of 
construction materials. In comparison, Turkish 
contractors have completed 25 projects in Egypt with 
a total value of 593 million dollars, almost one-
fiftieth of what they have accomplished in Libya.8 In 
other words, Turkey is doing big business in Libya. 
It is also important to note that before the uprising 
broke out in Libya, Turkey  had been on a major 
diplomatic and economic offensive toward this 
country. Erdoğan’s visit  to Libya in November 2009 
had been a turning point in relations, where the two 
sides agreed, in Erdoğan’s words, “to forget the past 
and build a new future”, lifted visa restrictions, and 
signed an agreement for the reciprocal promotion and 
protection of investments. During 2010, Erdoğan 
went to Libya four more times, during one of which 
he received the Qaddafi International Prize for 
Human Rights; and his Trade Minister, Zafer 
Çağlayan, paid five visits, all of which were 
accompanied by sizeable groups of businessmen. 
All was going well until the uprising muddied this 
picture. Turkish construction companies in Libya—
around 200 of them—had to evacuate Libya, leaving 
unfinished projects and equipment pools behind. 
Minister Çağlayan announced that Turkish companies 
had incurred a loss of 1.4 billion dollars in the form 
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of uncollected revenues and that another 97 million 
dollars of deposits remained in Libyan banks.9 To 
these figures should be added the losses caused by 
physical damage. On the other hand, the projects that 
the Turkish companies were working when the 
uprisings began had a total value of 15.3 billion 
dollars, and the fate of these projects remain 
uncertain. 
Losing Libya would certainly be a blow for the 
Turkish economy, and from an economic point of 
view one could argue that  Turkey did not turn its back 
to Qaddafi right away, as it did with Mubarak, 
because without him the future of Turkish business in 
Libya could be jeopardized. This line of argument, 
however, implies that democracy in Libya or the 
Middle East in general is not a concern for Turkey, 
since it can be easily dismissed when capitalistic 
benefits are at stake. My argument is that 
counterposing support for democracy to the pursuit  of 
material benefits in this way  is ungrounded because 
the two are not necessarily  mutually exclusive. In 
fact, in a neo-liberal setting, the two are interrelated 
in the sense that pursuing one’s material benefits can 
require the involved party  to adhere to universally 
accepted norms such as democracy, whereas, in the 
opposite direction, promoting democracy as a value 
might require the actor in question to possess 
economic power so that it can have leverage in 
political and social issues. 
Business in a foreign country  requires a favorable 
environment to flourish. If the market in question is a 
democracy, the rule of law provides this environment. 
The dilemma here is that a non-democratic regime 
can also provide a good business environment, 
however in this case it would be based on relations of 
patronage. In other words, only  selected business 
actors would be able to benefit from the environment 
and others would be excluded. Under the Qaddafi 
regime, this was the case in Libya. However, if the 
current regime is deposed, but only to be replaced by 
another form of an authoritarian regime, there will be 
no guarantee for Turkish companies to have the same 
favorable business environment as they did under 
Qaddafi. Another possible scenario for post-Qaddafi 
Libya is democratic transformation. The important 
question is whether democracy  will take root from 
within or will be imposed from without. 
Under the Qaddafi regime, that is since 1969 when he 
overthrew the king and established the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Turkey never felt the need to pressure the 
Libyan leader to heed the desires of Libyan people. 
Democracy in Libya is now a concern for Turkey, not 
only (but mainly) because democracy will be decisive 
in determining the fate of Turkish business presence 
in Libya. Turkey’s procrastinated response did not 
exactly  refer to a preference of capitalistic benefits 
over democracy, rather what Turkey did was to wait 
for different options for the post-Qaddafi period to 
develop so that it could make its choice. The 
alternatives included two democratic options: 
democracy from within, i.e. through the pro-
democracy  opposition, or democracy from without, 
i.e. through Western intervention. Turkey clearly 
preferred the first option, since the second option was 
highly  likely  to create a post-Qaddafi Libya in which 
business opportunities, particularly in the 
construction sector, would be distributed to 
contractors from Western countries. Whereas the 
experience of Iraq and Afghanistan set precedence for 
this scenario, a recent statement by the head of the 
Turkish Contractors Association, Erdal Eren, clearly 
revealed the concerns. Eren explicitly stated that the 
NATO intervention in Libya had economic motives 
and the business environment that is likely to emerge 
after the intervention was not going to be a favorable 
one for Turkish companies.10 At the end of the day, 
Turkey opposed the NATO intervention and decided
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instead to provide financial support for the opposition 
groups in Libya. It was also while the NATO 
intervention was on the way that the Turkish 
Parliament hurriedly ratified the investment 
agreement that was signed during Erdoğan’s visit to 
Libya in November 2009. In other words, Turkey was 
preparing for the post-Qaddafi period. 
Turkey supports democracy in Libya, and wants this 
to be achieved through local dynamics and this 
preference is directly linked to its calculations for the 
future of Turkish business in the country. In Egypt, 
with the absence of long-term business prospects, 
Turkey’s promotion of democracy was only related to 
the purpose of strengthening its role as a key  player in 
the region; therefore the response to the uprising was 
fast and firm. In Libya, the construction business 
complicated the picture, and Ankara needed time to 
determine its response. 
The uprising in Syria constitutes an even greater 
challenge for Turkey. Not only is there an intense and 
complicated web of economic relations between 
Turkey and Syria, but the two countries are also 
neighbors, which causes additional problems such as 
refugees and cross-border humanitarian crises. At the 
time of writing this essay, thousands of Syrian 
refugees were crossing the Turkish border in order to 
escape persecution by the Assad government. 
Turkey’s response so far has involved taking care of 
the Syrians crossing the border and asking Assad to 
make reforms. To what direction Turkey’s Syria 
policy will eventually develop remains to be seen.
In conclusion, Turkey’s response to the Arab spring is 
marked by different approaches to similarly 
motivated uprisings in different countries but this is 
by no means a sign of inconsistency in Turkey’s 
foreign policy. It is not about supporting democracy 
in countries with fewer economic prospects for 
Turkey and prioritizing the preservation of status quo 
in countries where Turkey is doing business. The two 
are not mutually exclusive and this is a false 
dichotomy. In fact, within the neo-liberal framework, 
democracy  can be (and usually is) supported for the 
purpose of improving business prospects, while 
increasing business volumes can provide an actor 
with the leverage it needs for assuming a role as the 
promoter of democratic values in its region. Turkey is 
experiencing both, and the variation in its responses 
to the uprisings in Egypt and Libya clearly  illustrate 
the dynamics of the crisis response process where 
both support for democracy and existence of large 
long-term business volumes are involved in an 
intertwined manner. 
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Footsteps of Revolution in the Land of 
Queen Sheba
Bezen Balamir Coskun*
Yemen, as a Persian Gulf country, has been at the 
crossroads of ancient spice roads connecting Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia for thousands of years. The 
Romans called this fertile and wealthy country 
Arabia Felix, in contrast to the Arabian Deserts to the 
North. However, compared to its wealthy and 
glorious past, Yemen is today  one of the poorest, 
underdeveloped and conflict-ridden nations in the 
world. In five years Yemen has witnessed six wars 
and more than 40 percent of the population lives on 
less than two dollars a day. Corruption and the 
mismanagement of the country’s oil resources 
brought Yemen to the brink of collapse. 
In 1967 the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) was formed in Southern Yemen, comprising 
Aden and former Protectorate of South Arabia. 
Between 1967 and 1971 thousands flew north 
following a crackdown on dissidents and armed 
groups formed to overthrow government. [(NOTE: 
Insert the name before this abbreviation.)] (YAR) and 
PDRY clashes started in 1972. The modern Republic 
of Yemen was born in 1990 when traditionalist North 
Yemen and Marxist South Yemen merged after years 
of border wars, with Ali Abdallah Saleh as president. 
The peace broke down in 1994 with a short civil war. 
Armies of the former north and south, which had 
failed to integrate, gathered on their former frontiers 
as relations between southern and northern leaders 
deteriorated. President Saleh declared a state of 
emergency and dismissed the southern government 
members following political deadlock and sporadic 
fighting. The civil war ended in defeat for separatist 
southerners and the survival of a “unified” Yemen. 
Still, tensions persist between the North and the 
South. Since the summer of 2009, hundreds have 
been killed and more than a quarter of a million 
people displaced by clashes between government 
troops and northern Houthi rebels belonging to the 
minority Shia Zaidi sect. The government declared a 
ceasefire with the northern rebels in February 2010.
Inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, in 
January 2011 Yemen’s opposition began to unite, and 
thousands of Yemenis have started protests against 
the 33-year rule of president Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
Even though Yemen has been the scene of social 
unrest for several decades, Saleh had been able to 
maintain the status quo thanks to tribal support and to 
U.S. financing. Until 2011, anti-government 
sentiments were concentrated in the southern region 
of Yemen, which, since the unification in 1990, has 
been struggling for independence, and in the northern 
mountains of Sa’da, which seek the return of the rule 
of Imams. 
Politically, Yemen is a one party state: the general 
People’s Congress. Although the government has 
allowed opposition, its influence in policy  making is 
limited. The only real contender to Saleh has been Al-
Ahmar’s clan, where the Hashid family  has 
constituted the main opposition to the government for 
many years. Apart from the Hashid, Bakhils are the 
second most powerful tribe in Yemen. Through the 
years Saleh ensured their support with financial 
incentives and preferential treatments. The social and 
economic gap between the upper class who have links 
with the government and the impoverished majority 
population that suffers from unemployment and 
social inequalities has brewed the anger against the 
regime. 
Current protests have spread through invitations sent 
to all parties including the Houthi’s in the north, the 
tribes, trade unions, civil society organizations and 
the army inviting them to join the protests. For the 
first time in this history  people from Southern Yemen 
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stopped calling for separation, raised the national flag 
and demanded an end to Saleh’s regime. Yemeni 
people seem to be actually united in their aim to 
change the regime through civil disobedience. If the 
whole uprising is not revolutionary, it is revolutionary 
to witness the sense of unity in a country with clear-
cut tribal and ideological differences. The key 
moment to now was when Hussein al-Ahmar, the 
chief of Yemen’s second largest  but most powerful 
tribal confederation, joined the protesters and 
promised to offer protection. Even al-Houthi, who 
fight for independence and generally have nothing to 
do with protestors, offered their support and 
resources. Despite the differences, the established 
opposition encouraged the uprising and street revolt.
While the Yemen protests share similar motivations to 
those in Egypt and Tunisia, it is still not clear that they 
will become successful. Unfortunately, Saleh did not 
follow Mobarak of Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia and 
leave the throne peacefully, but has insisted on 
dealing with protests by force. As of this writing, at 
least 200 protestors have been killed and thousands 
wounded in four months of protests. In June, 2011, 
President Saleh was flown to Saudi Arabia, suffering 
from injuries as a result of an explosion at his official 
compound. Still, Saleh had not formally  resigned his 
office, but only  temporarily handed power to his long-
term vice president, Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi. 
Yemen’s socio-political terrain consists of tribes. The 
country’s complex tribal dynamics are reflected in the 
course of events following the absence of Saleh after 
the explosion. The crisis had escalated into a fight for 
power between Yemen’s most powerful families: 
Saleh’s family  and the al-Ahmar family. The personal 
animosity between the sons of the late Sheikh 
Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar and the sons and 
nephews of Saleh have been an obstacle to peaceful 
regime change in Yemen. Right now, the protests of 
urban youth and civil society activists have been 
sidelined in the power competition between armed 
factions of these tribal elites.  Earlier feelings of unity 
within the society have begun to fade.  There is a need 
for a genuine mobilization of the public. The 
escalation of conflict is dangerously paving way to the 
fragmentation of the state in Yemen. 
As the political battle in Yemen escalates, the most 
immediate challenge is to avert a civil war.  Even if 
Yemenis avoid these outcomes and a peaceful 
transition occurs, they will face an economic crisis, 
regional tensions and an unstable security 
environment. Among all, the country  is in danger of 
the infiltration of al-Qaeda terrorists into the country. 
Given U.S. security forces have intensified their 
attention to hunt  Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni cleric 
and a member of al-Qaeda, the failed state of Yemen 
could become the next target for an U.S.-led 
intervention. It is important  for the international 
community  to understand the complexities of Yemeni 
politics and society, and to act accordingly. It  is also 
important to integrate Yemen into the international 
community  not to isolate it. Lack of successful nation-
building and state-formation, the tribal dynamics of 
Yemeni politics and society, and the failed-state 
phenomenon blur the possibility of peaceful transition 
in Yemen. In short, Yemen needs strategies and 
political will for a successful revolution. 
*Assistant Prof, Dr., Zirve University, International Relations 
Department. Gaziantep/ TURKEY. bezenbalamir@gmail.com
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T w o S i d e s o f t h e S a m e C o i n ; 
Conflicting Views of Islamism in 
Pakistan
Jeanette Bailey*
The turbulent nature of the political systems and 
government structure in Pakistan has given rise to 
many different religious Islamic groups. Two of the 
most notorious groups are the Jama’at-e-Islami (JI) 
and the Jama’at-ud-Da’wa (JD), as referenced by 
Humeria Iqtidar in her book Secularizing Islamists? 
(2011:ix). This essay will examine both differences 
and similarities between the JI and the JD.
The JI Islamist group began in Pakistan in 1944, 
during the British colonial rule. Founded by scholar 
Mawdudi, the group was composed entirely of 
religious clergy. Their goal was to maintain a pure 
Islamic movement in a push toward making Pakistan 
into a true Islamic state. Shortly after its founding a 
shift in the movement entered the group into the 
political arena, where they fought to bring about an 
Islamic revolution by  using the democratic process to 
enforce a change in the state that would then trickle 
down to the masses. This shift toward a government 
focus led to dissension in the group. While still 
democratically motivated today, the base of the 
movement is now composed of middle-class business 
men and women.
In contrast to the beginning of the JI, the JD was a 
movement created in response to Russia’s war with 
Afghanistan. JD’s original base pulled from the 
socially “undesirables,” and their sole mission was 
established to be jihad against the ‘godless secularist 
communists’. The JD was backed, and trained, by 
CIA, with money from the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, who then used the JD to their strategic 
advantage in the cold war with Russia. With the 
completion of the Afghanistan-Russian war the JD 
turned its attention to fellow Muslims whom they 
believed to have been corrupted by Western 
influence. They waged a new struggle to reform all 
Muslims, establishing their view of traditional 
Islamic practice as the only true Islamic practice. 
Like the JI, the JD also sought to establish an Islamic 
state.
While both Islamic groups today seek to establish the 
traditional Islamic State, they  are far from allies. It 
would seem that similar goals are not enough to form 
a homogenous unification. Many Islamic groups exist 
as oil that has been agitated in water. They form little 
droplets that race about trying to collect others like 
them, while simultaneously being pulled apart by 
similar droplets of oil attempting to achieve the same 
unification. The JI and JD may both seek the same 
end result, but much like the oil in water, they have 
very different opinions about what a traditional State 
looks like and how that State should be obtained.
The Jama’at-e-Islami believes that a democratic 
political approach should be used to gain control of
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[12]
the State. That power should then be used to 
implement change in favor of Islam at  the 
governmental level. The JI has struggled with this 
mission since their inception and has yet to achieve 
all that was hoped for in the beginning. Through this 
process their goals and interpretations of the Qur’an 
continually fluctuate to meet the needs of the times. 
They  are concerned with their namesake and dislike 
the more militant  fashion of the JD, whose faces are 
synonymous with the global ideal of terrorism. The JI 
worry  that the actions of the JD, who have claimed to 
be moving away from a militant focus, will cause the 
world to associate Islam and violence. Such 
associations would harm their political potential and 
undermine their end goals.
The Jama’at-ud-Da’wa prefers to be seen as a social 
pressure group that leans on the government to 
implement Islamic ideals. They see democracy as 
another form of secularization and see the JI’s 
approach to seeking power in the government as a 
long series of failures. They also believe that the 
incorporation of Islam and democracy  has led the JI 
to be corrupt. In the minds of the JD the JI are not 
true Islamists.
Tensions between the two groups also rise as they 
attempt to pull constituents from the same pool. Both 
groups spend time and money engaging in 
humanitarian acts to gain public support  for their 
rhetoric. Supporters of each group look down at the 
members of the other and there is a constant strain of 
tug of war to build the largest 
support base.
Whether political groups, or 
social pressure groups, and 
recognized or not, both the JI and 
J D a r e i n f l u e n c e d b y 
globalization and modernity. The 
JI changed their goals early on to 
focus on democratic politics; a 
tool derived by the secular 
capitalist world that they are in 
jihad against. The JD, too, has 
changed, looking to take a step 
back from their militant history 
in order to gain popularity and 
favor in the eyes of the people. The 
JD believes that power does not belong to the people 
but to Allah alone; yet in seeking the favor of their 
constituency they gain power in a democratic game.
As the unrest in the Middle East moves forward and 
governments, political parties and social movements 
begin to carve out a new identity, the Islamic world 
will have to either find a blending of Islam that is 
applicable to all, or learn to be content  with mild 
variations in religious interpretations and practice. 
The Qur’an calls for unity and peace, but until the 
agitation of the water is able to cease, the oil cannot 
find common ground.
* She is currently studying in the liberal arts and sciences as a 
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Egypt and the "Arab spring": Notes on 
facts and challenges 
Moises Garduño García *
After Mubarak’s fall, the issue in which scholars, 
moral leaders and many people are working 
nowadays is in the best way to carry out Egypt’s 
transition to democracy. Many young people who 
participated in the creation of the unthinkably 
successful (1) Egyptian revolution, had in the last days 
of March, attended training workshops on popular 
election mechanisms, transparency and other 
activities related to the surrender accountability  and 
human rights monitoring. Popular organization in the 
protests, which manifested itself in efforts to care for 
the houses, streets and neighborhoods (2) as well as in 
the sale and distribution of medicaments (usually a 
business controlled by  the Coptic population) to the 
mosques and hospitals, today steps up to the 
commitment to “safeguard the revolution” and to 
participate directly in building the political destiny of 
their country.
Institutions like University of Cairo, the Center for 
Political and Strategic Studies Al Ahram and the 
Center for Strategic and Future Studies of Medinat 
Nasr, to cite some institutions in the Egyptian capital, 
have promoted several efforts to build a clean 
parliamentary  and presidential election at year end (3). 
The debate caused by  monitoring the referendum on 
March 19, where the Egyptian people could exercise 
their opinion about accepting or not a series of 
reforms to the constitution (including those to limit 
mandates of the president and to reduce the 
requirements to be a candidate), helped to generate a 
new interest in Egyptian citizens to forget the 
pessimism and distrust about voting that prevailed 
under the old regime.
However, we still have “bumps in the road” in this 
process. For example, the army’s role as guarantor of 
security and justice has had a lot of critics among the 
Egyptian population. One evidence of this is the 
report “The army and the People Never Were 
One” published by  the activist Maikel Nabil 
SanadMark, who states that  the military  had been 
responsible for supplying ammunition to the police 
trying to suppress the riots of revolution in the first 
stage (from 25 January to 29 January, 2011), and who 
had also participated in the arrest, imprisonment and 
even torture of many demonstrators in several 
attempts to invade the Tahrir Square during a second 
stage (from 29 January to 11 February, 2011) and 
whom they  claim now works in the monopoly of the 
media, the ban on taking pictures in the center of the 
city and some incentives to obedience through mobile 
telecommunications companies via text message at 
the present stage (since the fall of Mubarak up to 
now)Mark.
The report shall be added to numerous allegations of 
other protesters against the Egyptian army and 
unjustified detention, abuse of power, and even 
torture. Thus, people have put into question the 
activities of the Egyptian army in its “police 
working” thereby increasing concern about the 
administration of justice in the streets of the 
capital. This is complemented by the announcement 
of the army  on March 22, 2011, when it banned any 
demonstration or strike, subjecting people to 
imprisonment or heavy fines. This, of course, would 
cause popular discontent  and more protests in first 
days of April, 2011Mark.
In regard to the international environment, the 
expansion of the “Arab Spring” to certain “strategic 
countries” has caused the “Great Powers” to interfere 
in these processes (whether political, intelligence or 
military) to maintain their interests in the area, 
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especially the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia and IranMark.
Analyzing the most important events in Egyptian 
foreign policy since Mubarak’s departure — this 
includes Mawafi’s visit to Syria, the authorization to 
several Hamas leaders to attend a meeting in 
Damascus via the Cairo airport, the permission for 
the passage of an Iranian ship by way of Suez, the 
neutrality in the Hariri’s case in Lebanon, along with 
a “friendly approach” with Hezbollah and the 
selection of Sudan as the first foreign destination of 
Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to define the priority of 
Egyptians on the subject of the Nile — we can 
perceive the intent of a policy based on the main 
interests of Egypt in what looks like the quest of a 
regional consolidation in its area of influence, a 
similar case to what Turkey does with its Iran-
friendly relations and its cooperation with the U.S. 
and Israel at the same timeMark.
Then, Egypt may be the target of pressure from a 
Washington-TelAviv axis to moderate the conduct of 
its foreign policy and turn in a direction similar 
Mubarak’s. To keep an independent foreign policy 
that achieves the export of the internal values that 
domestic politics of Egypt intends to build is a future 
challenge for the next Egyptian rulers. Although the 
popular consensus remains the demands of social and 
political rights of the people, domestic protests in 
Egypt have sent clear messages concerning the 
international affairs, or at  least its regional policy, 
announcing in demonstrations their commitment to 
the Palestinian people to fight for the respect of 
human rights in Gaza, Palestinian unity  and the 
rejection of the Israeli settlement program, and 
supporting other causes, such as support for the Iraqi 
people in their rejection of the U.S. armed presence, 
the demands of the people in Bahrain and Syria and 
slogans for the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh in 
Yemen. This summary allows notice of a consensus 
among the different Arab peoples, a dismissed 
phenomenon since the pan-Arab philosophy of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and the widespread opinion for the 
Palestinians in their conflict with IsraelMark.
In this sense, a revolution that emerged without 
leaders now must build a strong government  in order 
to create a strong regional leadership  to remain 
independent of the threat of these factors. Many 
young people, especially young people in Egypt, still 
have hopes for this and are working day and night to 
point out anomalies in the process of this 
construction, issues that for some analysts becomes 
like a renaissance, not only political but  also social, 
due to the plural participation of all social strata, 
without religious or ethnic divisions and with 
political hopes in commonMark.
Egypt enjoys a moment of “high responsibility”. 
New political parties may  be born based on young 
people who until now did not participate in any 
existing organization. But of course there are also 
fears. Fears of radicalization and the chaos created in 
part from fear that the new State cannot meet the 
minimum aspirations of the people, as was the case in 
other transition experiences in the world (and whether 
by revolution, armed interference, elections or other 
processes) that have failed to meet those challenges 
and whose transition to democracy did not complete, 
such was the case of Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Mexico 
and other countries which, with different stories and 
different ways, have experienced a “change in the 
name of democracy” but where problems such as 
corruption, violence, unemployment and political 
unrest have prevailed in spite of that experience. Thus 
the real challenge will be how Egypt responds to the 
aspirations of its people, how it  improves basic 
services, how it accommodates a new Islamist 
government apparatus (once again, can we see 
Turkey?), how it  rehabilitates the reputation of 
itsnational army in order to improve its relationship 
with the people after the elections. As we have seen, 
the army must act as guarantor of the democratic
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process and not as a repressive apparatus, an issue 
that is more reminiscent of devisive work of 
intelligence members than the army itself, and thus 
maintain what for many Arabs means the Egyptian 
model of resistance, if not a paradigm according the 
history of the Arab world, where it has been a 
cultural, social and linguistic model and a source of 
political inspiration to consider.
*	  Moises Garduño is Professor at Faculty of Political and Social 
Sciences of National Autonomous University of Mexico and 
PhD Candidate on Islamic and Arab Contemporary Studies by 
Autonomous University of Madrid. mgarduno@colmex.mx 
BIBLIOGRAPHY:	  
1 When Wail Ganem (who launched the call for protests on January 
2 5 v i a f a c e b o o k ) a p p e a r e d o n 9 F e b r u a r y 
i n Ta h r i r S q u a r e , p r o t e s t e r s g r e e t e d h i m a s a h e r o 
and after being released by the Egyptian security forces stated:
" W h e n I m a d e t h e p a g e ( a l l o f w e a r e 
Khaled Said) on facebook I was a dreamer, but now I am convinced 
that all of us here are dreaming together” http://www.aawsat.com/
details.asp?section=1&issueno=11761&article=607534
Accessed March 28, 2011.
2 A chronicle of Sharq al-Awsat cites the use of “the stick” as  a useful 
tool  to deal with potential violence in the streets during protest  times. 
People used to buy this popular and traditional tools in order to defend 
their own neighborhoods via guarding rounds. , http:/ /
w w w . a a w s a t . c o m / d e t a i l s . a s p ?
section=4&issueno=11754&article=606545 
3 See for example http://www.icfsthinktank.org/English/Default.aspx?
lang=en, accessed March 30, 2011.
4 Maikel Nabil Sanad, lives in Cairo, and is a political activist 
a n d b l o g g e r . I n A p r i l 2 0 0 9 h e f o u n d e d t h e 
Movement of Not to Compulsory Military Service. "As a pacifist, he 
declared his conscientious objection to military service and demanded 
to be exempted from it. He was arrested on November 12, 2010 by 
the military police but was released two days later and he was 
finally exempted from military service for medical reasons. Following 
the publication of its report on the Internet, he was arrested on March 
10, 2011. According to his lawyer, Nabil Sanad is  in custody 
a n d a w a i t i n g a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n o n s e v e r a l 
charges. See more on their facebook pages.




Accessed April 1, 2011.
5 Nabil, Maikel., The army and the people never were one, March 8, 
2011, Available at http://www.maikelnabil.com/2011/03/army-and-
people-wasnt-ever-one-hand.html, Accessed April 9, 2011.
6http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/56DBD67D-3A98-4EF2-
AC80-5FAE82093A6A.htm?GoogleStatID=1.
(Army avoids a new strike in Midan Tahrir, Al Jazeera, April  9, 2011. 
Accessed April 9, 2011.
7For example, blackout information in Syria and Bahrain can be a 
signal of some consensus among the elites of these countries in order 
to prevent the falling of Bashar al Assad and al Khalifa regimes because 
nobody (except the Syrian and Bahraini peoples) agrees 
t h a t t h i s p h e n o m e n o n o c c u r s . S y r i a h a s b e e n , a l o n g 
with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran's gateway to the Mashreq and a 
staunch ally against the U.S. and Israel rhetoric in the zone, while 
B a h r a i n h a s b e c o m e a c r i t i c a l p o i n t f o r 
maintaining "stability" between the Arab Gulf countries to the "Arab 
spring in one hand, and Iran Islamic proyect on the other one. 
Thus, consensus may lie in preventing Iran support  to 
Bahrain protesters in  exchange for not support the "rebels" in the Syrian 
case
8 BBC News,  ”Iran warships sail  via Suez canal amid Israeli concern”, 
BBC News, February 22, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-12533803,accessed April 10,  2011.
9 Al  Sherbibi, “Egyptian protesters  defy army”, Gulf News, April  10, 
2011 available at http://gulfnews.com/news/region/egypt/egyptian-
protesters-defy-army-1.789692, Accessed April 23, 2011.
10 During the Mubarak regime protests were few in number due to 
torture mechanisms of the government. Generally, workers and young 
people were repressed every time they took the streets ( for example in 
2008 a protest organized by kifaya movement  was well received by 
people but just  hundreds appeared in the streets). However, one 
of the strongest protests  was those against the killing 
o f Kha led Saeed , a c r i t i c o f t he r eg ime  who was 
killed in June 2010 and whose death caused outrage among the 
Egyptian population, first in Alexandria and later in Cairo, 
population under the slogan "all  of we are Khaled Saeed" took 
the streets bringing nearly 20000 people in the Egyptian capital. The 
revolution has started from this moment. 
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[16]
The Arab Spring and the Turkish Model
Alper Y. Dede*
The notion of regime change through mass uprisings 
in the Middle East was inconceivable until the mass 
uprisings started in Tunisia after a young Tunisian 
street vendor set himself on fire to protest the local 
authorities. Until this “Arab Spring” started, experts 
of the region had been commenting on the need for 
gradual reform to make the transition from the 
inefficient and authoritarian status-quo regimes to 
more democratic ones. Accordingly, the routes to 
democratization in the region had to be through 
gradual social, economic and political reforms. In this 
vein, gradual change and transition to more 
democratic regimes in the region would be inevitable 
as secularization and modernization took root  in the 
long run. Additionally, people in the region would 
become fed up with the authoritarian rulers and create 
internal pressures for more democracy. A developing 
civil society  and international pressures from the 
world community  would aid the whole process of 
democratization. In short, these were briefly the 
recipes for a possible route to democratization in the 
Middle East until the mass uprisings on the Arab 
streets. However, the way that the Arab Spring took 
place seems to be in contradiction with what the 
experts had been arguing regarding the prospects of 
democratization in the region.
Political Change through Revolutions? 
On one hand, the idea of political change through 
revolutions is not something new for the region. The 
Iranian revolution of 1979 replaced the Shah regime 
with an Islamic autocracy. On the other hand, 
political change through revolutions is completely 
unexpected in the region. Besides the structural 
factors (such as the overall inefficiency of the 
governments in the region, high rates of 
unemployment and underemployment, mass poverty, 
authoritarianism, and lack of democracy), two 
additional factors fueled the uprisings on the Arab 
streets:  i) the availability of modern means of 
communication, and ii) the well-educated young 
masses’ high levels of frustration as a result of 
stagnancy and inefficiency of the regimes whose only 
purpose was to maintain the status quo. Without these 
two factors, the Arab Spring would not have been 
possible. 
Social sciences teach us that mass movements or 
uprisings do not take place in a vacuum. Certain 
structural factors must exist for the mass movements 
to ferment,  like high rates of unemployment, mass 
poverty, economic cr ises , ineff ic iency of 
g o v e r n m e n t s , l a c k o f d e m o c r a c y a n d 
authoritarianism. Additionally, the movement 
organizers must be able to effectively communicate 
with each other and with the members, to mobilize 
the available resources to attract new members to the 
movement, to promote political activism, to take 
available opportunities whenever and wherever they 
can, and to frame their grievances to urge members to 
take part in the collective action. In a way, 
availability of the means of social media for the 
frustrated young educated Arabs became an 
opportunity for them to disseminate their 
revolutionary  messages through the Internet as well 
as providing them an avenue to frame their messages. 
In other words, the mass uprisings could become 
possible as a result of the availability  of 
communication among the group members through 
the Internet.
Can the Turkish Process of Democratization 
Genuinely Become a Model for the Region?
The Turkish Republic was established in 1923 and 
shifted from authoritarian single-party  rule to a 
democratic multiparty system in 1950. Since 1950 —
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despite several interruptions in the form of military 
interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and the e-
memorandum in 2007 — Turkey  has exhibited 
significant strides toward democratization during the 
tenures of Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal as prime 
ministers. A similar process is currently  going on 
under AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and 
Development Party) rule. While many countries of 
the Middle East have been experiencing mass 
uprisings, the following question has to be answered: 
Can Turkey’s unique democratization experience 
since the AKP’s rise to power be a model for the 
Middle Eastern countries as well as for the Ikhwan 
and other political actors in the region? For some, 
Turkey has now politically and economically become 
a model country  for the rest of the region. Thus, what 
makes Turkey attractive for the emerging regimes?
Recently, one of the prominent Ikhwan figures, Abdel 
Moneim Abou Al Fotouh, indicated that the Ikhwan 
would form a new party like Turkey’s ruling AKP (1). 
A similar statement was made earlier by  Rachid 
Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s Islamic Al Nahda 
movement. To understand the appeal of the Turkish 
model, we have to have a look at  what the model is 
and how it became appealing. 
During the Cold War years, Turkey had limited 
economic and diplomatic relations with the Muslim 
world since the Kemalist elites during those years 
naively assumed that  increasing foreign relations with 
other Muslim countries would be detrimental to the 
secularist nature of the Turkish republic. This self-
imposed isolationist policy remained in place until 
the AKP’s rise to power in 2002. However, feint signs 
of departure from this strict isolationist policy  existed 
during Turgut  Özal’s leadership in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, before the AKP’s rise to power. By 
liberalizing the Turkish economy and enabling the 
emergence of conservative businessmen coming 
mostly  from conservative towns in central Anatolia, 
Özal actually allowed the conservative capitalists of 
Turkey—dubbed the Anatolian tigers—to expand 
economically. Those capitalists later formed the 
social and economic backbone of the AKP rule in 
Turkey. Currently, it is this new class of conservative 
businessmen that take the AKP’s economic and 
political openings to the Middle East. This unique 
mutual relationship between the conservative 
capitalists and the AKP was beneficial to both: The 
AKP found much needed political and economic 
support against the secularist establishment while the 
conservative capitalists found venues to expand their 
political and economic operations under the AKP’s 
protection in the new era. This unique relationship 
forms the first pillar of the Turkish model. 
The Turkish Islamists’ market-oriented economic 
approach constitutes the second pillar of the Turkish 
model. The Turkish economic model is especially 
marked by  the Turkish economy’s success with 
rapidly increasing GNP per capita and steady 
economic growth over the years, independent of 
state-led economic growth. The Turkish economy is 
also well connected to the global economy and is able 
to integrate the conservative entrepreneurs who 
mostly come from central Anatolian cities like 
Kayseri, Konya and Gaziantep. Turkish economic 
successes also include increasing exports, and the 
growing share of industrial goods in Turkish exports, 
which are mostly  lacking elsewhere in the Arab 
world. 
In this approach, economic successes and gains, not 
pure ideology, are the main driving forces. Earlier, in 
the late 1980s, the liberal spaces created by Turgut 
Özal’s reforms paved the way for the emergence of 
this type of market-based Turkish Islamism from 
which the rest of the Arab world was deprived. As a 
result  of their export-oriented economic growth 
strategies, the Turkish Islamists have gradually 
become market-seekers: as they economically grew,
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they  started to seek new markets for their goods. The 
new markets were found in the Middle East, Africa 
and Central Asia, whose people were predominantly 
Muslims. This expansion overlaps with the AKP’s 
long-term economic strategies to expand Turkey’s 
exports that would inevitably  make Turkey a country 
that has a larger role in the regional trade. This could 
also make Turkey a soft power in the region as well. 
In the last decade, Turkish goods have become very 
popular in the Middle East. Turkey’s popularity  in the 
region is not just limited to goods. Indeed, Turkish 
television soap operas have become very  popular in 
the region. Additionally, as a result of lifting of visa 
restrictions with many of the countries of the region, 
the volume of Middle Eastern tourists visiting Turkey 
has sharply increased. A similar increase has taken 
place in the Middle Eastern investments in Turkey 
since the AKP’s rise to power. Thus, Turkey’s 
economic success and the newly  emerging 
conservative business elite have increased its soft 
power in the region and that constitutes the third 
pillar of the Turkish model.
Conclusion
In addition to the three pillars mentioned above, 
Turkey’s process of democratization, rising economic 
performance, Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s popularity in 
the Arab world (particularly regarding the Palestinian 
issue and Turkey’s gradual distancing from Israel), 
and the AKP’s cultural-religious affinity  with the 
people of the region in contrast to the Kemalists and 
secularists in Turkey has also contributed to its 
attraction to people in the Middle East. Additionally, 
the AKP’s ability to successfully  move from 
relatively heavy Islamist  tones into a centrist political 
movement with a conservative outlook has 
significantly contributed to Turkey’s gradual rise as a 
soft power in the region. Indeed, on several different 
occasions, AKP officials have described themselves 
as a political party that is similar to the European 
Christian Democrats, which indicates the AKP’s 
willingness not be perceived as a hardliner Islamist 
party  (2).  Before coming to power, the AKP elites 
gained very valuable lessons from their experience 
serving at the local levels. For instance, Erdoğan used 
to be Istanbul’s mayor. Indeed, the AKP descends 
from the political legacy of Erbakan’s National Order 
Party, which has allowed the AKP members to build a 
s ign i f ican t amount o f par l i amenta ry and 
governmental experience over the years. Besides 
gaining political experience, this served as a 
moderating influence on the party itself. During the 
AKP’s tenure, the motive to succeed economically 
has often times superseded harsh ideological 
positions and moderated ideological excesses in the 
long run, besides exposing people to different ideas 
and lifestyles as a result of increasing economic 
transactions with the global economy.
These moderating factors or dynamics that are 
peculiar to the Turkish model do not exist in the Arab 
world, which clearly  shows the distinctiveness of the 
Turkish model. Considering the “democratic deficit” 
argument regarding the Middle East in Western 
academic and media circles, the Turkish model 
becomes more meaningful because it suggests that 
democracy  can function in a Muslim country, and that 
conservative Muslims can be democrats actively 
advocating democracy, economic growth, and rights 
and freedoms.
*Assistant Prof, Dr., Zirve University, Gaziantep/ 
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Will geopolitics split along sectarian 
lines in the Middle East? Witnessing 
the rise of a sectarian speech amidst 
war of perceptions
Camille Germanos∗ 
The upheaval in Bahrain revived geopolitical rivalries 
between Iran and the Arab Gulf States. These 
rivalries are potentially  to be drawn over sectarian 
lines and could entrench the rift between the Sunni 
and Shi’ite Muslim sectsMark. To prevent the 
possibility of this ethnic conflict, we need to better 
understand the intricacies of these competing 
sectarian speeches. We propose to describe briefly  in 
this piece the formation of a sectarian speech in the 
Middle East amidst a war of perceptions between the 
leading Shi’ite and Sunni clerics. 
When the battles of hearts and minds were first 
started in the Middle East  last January, two leading 
clerics joined their voices with the Arab 
revolutionaries, the Sunnite Ulema Sheikh Yūsuf al-
Qaraḍāwiy  and the Shi’ite Sayed Hassan Nasrallah. 
Both of these were vocal about the Tunisian 
revolution, which became the vanguard of the Arab 
wave of upheavals. Both of them backed-up the 
demonstrations that followed against totalitarian Arab 
regimes in Egypt, Yemen and Libya. Yet, those 
upheavals were never defined as sectarian or as 
profoundly marked by geopolitics. The trend was to 
describe these indigenous popular movements as 
having no ambition to export themselves beyond the 
national borders. 
This political perception changed, sadly, when the 
uprising expanded toward the frontiers of the Arab 
world, namely Bahrain and Syria. The clerics’ 
diverging speeches delegitimized seriatim the 
Bahraini and the Syrian oppositions as sectarian and 
exogenous, with foreign conspirator agendas. The 
adoption of diplomatic double majors by  the 
“International Community” did not ease the dogmatic 
contradictions. We wonder if the Arab revolutions 
will henceforth be able to transcend the Shi’ia—
Sunni divide.
Two opposing clerical voices: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwiy 
and Sayed Hassan Nasrallah
This sectarian dispute was indeed started March 2011 
over the appraisal in Bahrain. It was during the 
khutbat al-jum'a of 18 of March 2011, Ulema Sheikh 
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwiy, who is the president of the 
World Federation of Muslim Scholars, described from 
Doha, Qatar, that the Bahraini revolution was a 
sectarian one. Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, theologian 
and Secretary General of Hizballah, hinting to al-
Qaraḍāwiy, responded in a speech he gave the very 
next day in Lebanon. While al-Qaraḍāwiy excluded 
the Bahrain revolution from the legitimate Arab 
appraisal, Nasrallah claimed that the rights of dignity 
and justice are not tributary of a sectarian identity.  
These speeches, pronounced by two opposing 
politically influential clerics, defined the future 
perception of the Bahraini crisis. On one hand, Ulema 
Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwiy,Mark who in the past had a 
prominent role within the intellectual leadership of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, has been directly involved 
through his khutba in both the Egyptian and 
contemporary  Arab revolutions. Al-Qaraḍāwiy, who 
once called on Maydan al-Tahrir in Egypt for both 
Muslims and Christians to join their prayers thanking 
God, whom he said answered their prayers for 
protection during the Egyptian revolution that had put 
an end, on the 20th of February, to the corrupt regime 
of Hosni Mubarak, later condemned on March 18 the 
Bahraini opposition with his disgrace. On the other 
hand, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, who, since 1993, has 
been the Secretary General of Hezbollah, an armed 
and religious organization considered to be the
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resistance by the official and popular Lebanese 
discourse,Mark called on his allies from all 
nationalities and sects for unity  and coordination in 
their fight against  oppression and unfairness 
particularly in Bahrain.
 
Various dimensions of the divergences between 
Sheikh Yūsuf and al-Qaraḍāwiy Sayed Hassan 
Nasrallah 
The clerics’ perceptions echo the divergences 
between the doctrinal and political differences 
between the Sunni militant formations, e.g., the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and Hezbollah, the Shi’ite 
organization, in their fights for Justice and 
FreedomMark. This historical disparity  is to be 
distinguished from the irreconcilable cohabitation of 
Sunni and Shi’ite heritage of the war in Iraq; a 
cohabitation that seemed recently  to be repairing over 
political, ideological, and dogmatic fields. One could 
have hoped that the changes in the Arab and Islamic 
world would permit a new departure toward an open 
Islam, which would have put  an end to the extremist 
Salafist groups that have deepened the rupture 
between the Sunni and the Shi’a since the 1980s. 
The tensions in politics persist, despite all signs of 
rapprochement between the Sunni and Shi’a in the 
field of dogma and in the struggles between the 
different armed Islamic factions in the Middle East. 
The question is, are we witnessing the first signs of 
the re-making of a sectarian speech? In the fields of 
the social sciences, we accept that social categories 
can also be conveyed through religious or political 
speeches and that social groups can be constructed or 
identified based on exogenous perceptions of their 
constituencies. These social categories can be 
appropriated and integrated by the group  being 
described who might start agglomerating and 
describing themselves as such. 
The same phenomena can also be described in 
various ways: a social or a political reality can be 
constructed with reference to a selected chapter(s) in 
history.
If one were to draw a conclusion from the 20th 
century and the example of the Bahraini outburst, the 
opposition’s demand appears to be a social query for 
justice, integration into civil services and equitable 
wealth distribution. The Bahraini opposition, 
perceived mainly as a Shi’ite movement, can equally 
be accused of Persian affinities. Looking back to the 
16th century, the island of Bahrain was indeed subject 
to struggles for hegemony between the Arab and the 
Persian shores of the Persian Gulf. “Truth” is 
ambiguous in this case. It consists mainly of a 
recollection based on the imagination and 
mechanisms of perception and appropriation.Mark It is 
exactly  within this frame of thought that  the speeches 
of al-Qaraḍāwiy  and Nasrallah are to be analyzed in 
this piece. 
Having been vocal on the Egyptian and the Tunisian 
appraisals, after he prayed for the death of Qadhafi 
and hoped for the Yemeni opposition to succeed in 
days, al-Qaraḍāwiy  declared that the Bahraini 
revolution was a Shi’ite appraisal against the Sunni 
and therefore was incomparable with the Tunisian, 
Libyan, Egyptian or Yemani revolutions. Al-
Qaraḍāwiy  made reference to the early March events 
when demonstrations had crossed sectarian lines. The 
Ulema described the Shi’ite in Bahrain as attacking 
the Sunni, squatting their mosques and vandalizing 
their districts. Devoid of their legitimacy, the 
Bahraini opponents to the regime were actually 
described as vandal secessionists, and therefore the 
Shi’ite clerics were called to seek dialogue with the 
ruler who, according to al-Qaraḍāwiy, was willing to 
negotiate and make concessions.
In fact, the social claims and quest for a constitutional 
monarchy degenerated into violence and sectarian
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tensions when the Al-Khalifah monarch called for the 
intervention of the Gulf military force. From a social 
scientific perspective, such a move can only push the 
opposition to define its identity in opposition to the 
ruler by using exogenous associations. As it is 
considered, rather than holding them in a national 
Bahraini identity, the King has excluded the 
opposition from both national and territorial 
legitimacy. 
No matter how one explains these mechanisms, the 
fact is that the Bahraini demonstrators held posters of 
Iranian and Hezbollah religious leaders to face the 
public forces’ retaliation. This cost the Bahraini 
insurrectionists being described by  al-Qaraḍāwiy  as a 
group of Shi’ite dissidents. They were also accused of 
foreign allegiance, as al-Qaraḍāwiy claimed that the 
Bahraini Shi’ite were relating themselves to the 
Iranians instead of identifying themselves as people 
from the Arab Gulf. 
Last, but not least, the eminent cleric al-Qaraḍāwiy 
clearly  contributed, in his long speech, to making a 
difference between the Sunni and the Shi’ite sects and 
that is exactly  constitutive of a sectarian speech: “I 
have always been accused of being against the 
Shi’ite, I am not against the Shi’ite. I am only against 
sectarianism and religious hatred.” A day later, 
Saturday, 19 of March, 2011, Nasrallah took the 
opportunity in his speech, delivered under the slogan 
of solidarity  with the Arab revolutions, to answer 
back al-Qaraḍāwiy without naming him.
Looking at the structure of this speech, one can see 
that Nasrallah first addressed the Bahraini, bringing 
moral support to their opposition, by  consolidating 
religious support with their cause and re-describing 
their appraisal as a peaceful movement. He then 
addressed all religious clerics from the Sunni and 
Shi’ite sects, as well as their political allies, namely 
Recep Tayyip  Erdoğan Prime Minister of Turkey and 
the Iranian Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hoseyni Khāmene'I, 
to stand by the so-called human dignity and rights for 
justice, irrespective of religious sectarianism and 
urging them to remain attached to their common 
values and to stand by  the deprived and fight for the 
most elementary human rights.  
Thus, Nasrallah first  called for the Bahraini to stand 
by their principles and not  to fear sectarian speeches. 
He reassured the mostly  Shi’ite opposition that there 
were leading Sunni clerics who stood by their 
legitimate demands. These words resonated even 
more as they were reinforced by a large Sunni clerical 
representation among the audience that day. He then 
described the Bahraini revolution as peaceful 
populat ion appraisal that  was faced with 
governmental violence and murder. The Bahraini 
went for dialogue, he claimed, and they  stood by their 
unity  and their human values and reclamations. 
Arabic armies were sent to stand by a regime that was 
never menaced to fall. They locked the hospitals and 
destroyed the peoples’ home. Even Loulou Square 
was destroyed, a sign of the unbearable weight of the 
opposition symbols. For those who are familiar with 
the history  and politics of the Gulf, it  is 
understandable that exogenous symbols, namely 
Persian, are unbearable to these regimes, whose 
national identities were also consolidated based on 
external factors of especially  Persian differentiation. 
It is also unfortunate, but quiet  frequent, to witness 
amidst foreign military intervention the destruction of 
national symbols.
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Having tightened the vise around al-Khalifa rule by 
contrasting them to a peaceful opposition, Nasrallah 
finally asked why one should keep silent on the 
Bahraini movement, or worse, why one should attack 
their claim just because of their sectarian religious 
identity  of being Shi’ite. The opposition in Bahrain 
being mostly Shi’ite should not be deprived from the 
right to stand up  for their dignity, he claimed. No one 
ever questioned the religions or sects of the 
Palestinians, the Libyans, the Tunisians, or the 
Egyptians to stand by  their rights. How then could 
some khutba attack these movements because of their 
sectarian identity? The Bahraini movement is not 
sectarian, Nasrallah ascertained, but rather a civil 
peaceful movement as rightful as the Libyan or the 
Yemeni rebels’ claims.  
Nasrallah’s art of rhetoric and fighting history  made 
him sound more political than al-Qaraḍāwiy. But he 
personally attacked the al-Khalifah rulers, threatening 
at the same time the Arab monarchs of the Gulf. Such 
a statement could in the least cost him a war of words 
with his newly  declared enemies, who “reminded” 
him soon after that he was the leading figure of a 
terrorist organization. The Bahraini’s response to 
Nasrallah’s direct attacks was to menace all Lebanese 
interests in the Gulf. 
It is known in political science that if one can capture 
the starting point  of the break between main political 
actors it becomes possible to justify a period in 
history. Such a period might be triggered by the two 
speeches that  were delivered by Nasrallah and al-
Qaraḍāwiy. There is no doubt that the dissonances in 
perceiving the Bahraini crisis paved the way for 
future struggles in the Middle East, especially if a 
cynical betrayal of the aspirations of the Arab youth 
will play in favor of the most rigid or quarrelsome 
factions.
* Camille Germanos holds an MPhil from EHESS in Paris.  She 
is currently Research Associate to the National University of 
Singapore’s Middle East Institute. The views expressed herein 
are her own. Camille.germanos@yahoo.fr 
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Turkey as a Model Democracy? 
Revisiting the Turkish Referendum 
Oguz Alyanak* and Umit Kurt**
On the day before commemorating the martyrdom of 
Saint Valentine, Guardian columnist Robert Talt 
published an article that sketched the main points of 
contention in Turkish democracy. Far from being a 
model for the Middle Eastern states, let alone Egypt, 
Talt paid a visit to the dark side of the moon, laid out 
Turkey’s new path as one of Egyptification and, 
following up  on Gareth Jenkins’ statement that 
Turkey exchanges militant authoritarianism with a 
civilian one, warned his readers of the possibility  of 
an authoritarian comeback. At a time when the 
international press was flooded with articles praising 
the “Turkish model”, Talt has rowed the boat against 
the flow, which was followed by the newly-appointed 
American Consul-General Ricciardone’s critical 
statement: “I do not understand how Turkish 
journalists could be detained while at the same time 
addresses about freedom of speech are given.” 
In this article, we delve into Turkish political culture 
and outline some of the “darker” aspects of the 
“Turkish model”. Following the debate that Talt, 
among many others, has started, we argue that  Turkey 
has yet to become a consolidated democracy that can 
serve as an exemplar for the Middle East. To back 
this argument, we point out to some of the lessons 
that can be drawn from Turkey’s latest attempt at 
democratization, the referendum of 12 September 
2010.  
Referendum Revisited
On 12 September 2010, precisely thirty  years after 
experiencing one of the four coup d’états, which have 
indubitably  shaped the course of Turkish democracy, 
Turkish constituents attended a referendum to vote on 
an amendment that would change 26 articles of the 
current Constitution, established by the army 
generals, notably, Kenan Evren, some twenty-eight 
years ago. Ironic is that the constitution of 1982, 
amended in various occasions, including the 
referendum of 12 September 2010, was also the 
product of another referendum conducted on 7 
November 1982. The results in 1982 were an 
overwhelming 91 percent to 9.
Perhaps, it was foolish optimism to expect results that 
would radically deviate from the above given the 
figures in 1982, when the shadow of Mr. Evren and 
his brothers-in-arms were still present. However, in 
2010, the picture was much different, and arguably 
brighter. Both the supporters of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) and the opposition 
perceived the then-upcoming referendum as fair 
game. In other words, there was hope that something 
would change: be it the constitution, the “hapless 
fate” of the Turkish Republic or the AKP itself. 
Leaving the 2007 memorandum aside, Turkish 
politics, for one thing, had not been intervened by the 
military since 1997. Hence, the very visible hand of 
the army in this equation was almost nullified. 
Moreover, from a more academic perspective, it 
could very well be argued that Turkey was adamant
on its process of democratization, although what the
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word democratization means can itself be questioned. 
Negotiations with the EU, though slow, were on 
track, and so was the adoption of the chapters of the 
acquis communautaire. Borrowing the vocabulary of 
the political scientist Stephen Linz, there were 
adequate variables to argue for, and more importantly 
believe in, Turkey’s progression toward a 
consolidated democracy. 
Hope for Change?
Hope, however, was ephemeral. The night of 12 
September 2010 proved to be one of those black and 
white moments where, on the one side, those who 
voted for the constitutional change were cheering in 
euphoria, and the rest were saddened in remorse. 
Whereas the results of the referendum were 
predictable for some, they were frustrating and 
surprising for others. What stood as surprising for us 
is not necessarily  the results, but rather the kinds of 
discussions these results ignited among intellectual 
circles and, more significantly, the repercussions of 
such discussions for evaluating ideological cleavages 
in Turkey. On the one hand, prominent academics and 
columnists argued that  the results reflected the 
division of the Turkish society on the basis of secular 
(read, Kemalist), conservative (read Islamist) and 
ethnic (read Kurdish) identities. On the other hand, 
certain academics, along with members of the AKP, 
interpreted the results (and the overwhelming 
percentage of votes in favor of a constitutional 
change) as a potential for social incorporation and 
adhesion. Rejecting the tri-partite categorical division 
proposed by the former camp, the latter camp was 
driven by  the hope for finally changing Turkey’s 
three-decade-old Constitution.
But change itself needs to be problematized not only 
for what it brings, but how it  is handled. If Turkey, 
under the reign of the AKP government, is 
undergoing a transformative stage in its modern 
history, a stage that nourishes hope for change, be it 
for the good or the bad, how can factors contributing 
to this change be explained? What does such change 
signify for Turkey? And where can the leitmotif that 
is contributing to the ruling AKP’s voracious appetite 
for change be found?
If one aims to portray  the fundamental reason behind 
the rise and success of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his 
AKP, and decipher the rationale behind his (and his 
party’s) success in the referendum, one should be 
more aware of the historical context through which 
such change has been taking place, and thus pay 
closer attention to the structural-functionalist residues 
of a social corporatist system bolstered by the lack of 
a class-free system, let alone free of any deliberation 
on class based struggle, and the prevalence of 
conservatism and traditionalism as elements 
substituting the moral void of laicite. These two 
elements, coupled with transitions in the international 
context (e.g., neoliberal revival and the impact of 
globalization) contribute immensely to what can now 
be called both a transformation of the Turkish 
political culture. A clever constellation of these two 
elements paved the way for Erdoğan to decode the 
behavior of the Turkish constituents and orient the 
AKP’s rhetoric accordingly.




As far as the Turkish context is concerned, since, it is 
highly  improbable to speak of a continuation of a 
political culture constructed on class-based identities 
or a public space that promotes discussion on class 
relations, the use of the term “class formation” in 
Turkey is indeed more of an oxymoron than a reality. 
With the obvious exception being the 1970s where 
the Marxist winds of the Cold War carried ideological 
dusts leading to the formation of different factions 
among the left  and the right, and eventually to the 
coup d’état of 1980 which put an end to not only  the 
nascent signals of a potential class-based system, but 
also political activism in whole and monopolized 
power in the hands of army general for a period of 
two years, Turkey’s experience with class has either 
been curbed under the rubric of an Islamic or national 
unity. Whereas the former divided the society more or 
less on the basis of religious preferences, the latter 
imagined a conflict-ridden and classless society 
where each and every  citizen acted in harmony to 
make the social organism, that  is, the society, live and 
prosper. Not only  was this Durkheimian narrative on 
social beings —  which was transmuted into the 
Turkish case by the pre-eminent ideologue of his 
time, and the founding father of Turkish nationalism, 
Ziya Gokalp  — adopted as a de facto founding 
principle of the Turkish Republic, but, throughout the 
entire span of modern Turkish history, it continued to 
be a principle organizing (and disciplining) Turkish 
society. Thus, in a society  where contradictory voices 
were of ten repressed, e i ther through the 
administrative power of the government, juridical 
power of courts or the hard power of the army, the 
ruling governments enjoyed a great space of 
maneuver, with being checked and balanced only by 
the Constitutional Court or the army.
This also explains a great part of the tension attached 
to the referendum. In conjunction with a “Yes” voting 
in the constitutional referendum, the AKP’s plans to 
enlarge membership of two top judicial bodies — the 
Constitutional Court and the Higher Council that 
appoints judges and prosecutors — have aroused 
particular concern because the judiciary is still seen 
by secular Turks as an ardent bulwark against 
creeping “Islamization,” especially at a time when the 
military is gradually retreating from politics.
The role of the three institutions — the military, 
judiciary  and state bureaucracy (including civil-
military bureaucrats) — is worth a closer look for a 
very simple reason: their intervention and impact on 
Turkey’s democratic experience, in the name of 
secularism, social order or the Kemalist legacy, has 
simply  failed to circumvent a political party with 
Islamist roots claiming 47 percent of the votes in 
national elections and 39 percent of the votes in local 
elections, in 2007 and 2009, respectively. This 
tripartite structure, guarding the legacy of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, 
played an active role in suppressing previous 
governments with Islamist tendencies (such as the 
Welfare Party’s closure in 1997) and was almost 
successful in taking the AKP down in 2008. The 
referendum of 2010 came at a time when this 
structure was shattering, hence raising pro-secularist 
fears and concerns about the implementation of the 
AKP’s “hidden agenda” which would arguably lead 
to “bad change,” that is change of the regime from an 
arguably democratic one to an Islamist one. 
Consequently, one of the biggest concerns rising from 
the opponents of constitutional changes was that a 
“Yes” vote would bring the removal or weakening of 
an essential mechanism that  supervised the actions of 
the government.
Furthermore, it was argued that the victory of the 
AKP in the constitutional referendum would 
undermine the power of the military  and make the 
Turkish political system accountable to its voters and 
elected officials rather than its soldiers. All these
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steps toward democratization transpire as a fully-
fledged democratic transition, which enhances the 
role given to the Turkish “political society.” This 
“political society” encapsulates, as another prominent 
political scientist Alfred Stepan underlines, core 
institutions of a democratic political society  such as 
political parties, elections, electoral rules, political 
leadership, intraparty alliances, and legislature. In a 
nutshell, what the ramifications of this referendum 
manifest are the consolidation of the aforementioned 
institutions of a political society  rather than appointed 
elites of the étate. It is the instruments of the political 
society that are taking over the role corruptly 
practiced by  the tripartite structure. Crystallization of 
“political society” transformed these institutions and 
agencies into subjects of political contestation and 
paved the way  toward a democratic system as “ the 
only game in [the Turkish] town”.
Possibility of Conservative Change
At this point, we wish to start analyzing the second 
dynamic in effect: conservatism. The current situation 
regarding conservatism in Turkey  could best be 
described as an “opening of tradition” when 
indicators such as the following are taken into 
consideration: staunch support of conservative social 
classes to Turkey’s EU-bid, the new civil constitution 
initiative, democratic control of the armed forces, and 
civilization of the political arena. These examples 
would suffice to argue that in Turkey, the modernity 
paradigm is shifting, and the terms “secular,” 
“conservative,” “progressive,” “backward.” 
“Kemalist” and “Islamist” are attaining new values. 
What secular-Kemalists, who regard themselves as 
modernist and progressive, do not comprehend, 
however, is the fact that a conservative individual can 
act in a progressive manner and an allegedly 
progressive individual can, in turn, act in a 
conservative manner. Hence, it would not be wrong to 
speak of Islamist progressivism or Kemalist 
conservatism. Both are hierarchical structurally and 
both employ tools repressing internal, dissident 
voices.
Moreover, this opening of tradition also brings 
increased visibility  in economic and social spheres of 
public life. Conservative classes that have played a 
considerable role in the AKP’s rise to power are the 
“new-rising middle classes” of Turkey, which, in a 
report published in 2007 by  an international 
organization, European Stability Initiative, was 
termed also as the rise of the “Anatolian Tigers.” 
These socio-economic classes literally  encompass the 
new industrial, commercial, and financial bourgeoisie 
in Turkey. They willingly espouse democracy  by 
promoting active participation in civil society and 
defend the neo-liberal mechanism of a free market 
economy. Moreover, they also embrace Islamic 
conservative values as their lifestyle and bring further 
visibility  of Islam to Turkish secular spaces. In doing 
so, they do not necessarily relinquish their ties with 
modernity/modernization. However, they represent an 
alternative to modernity  that can at its best be 
considered a neo-conservative perspective vis-à-vis 
mainstream secular modernity  in Turkey. At this 
point, the AKP incarnates the modernity  standpoint  of 
these new conservative social classes.
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The two dynamics this article focused on are perhaps 
the two most underestimated ones in discussions on 
Turkish politics. The issue here is not that the 
dynamics analyzed in this paper often go 
undiscussed. In fact, there is plethora of discussion 
especially on conservatism and traditionalism in 
Turkey. However, for the most part, the discussion on 
these two elements is often conducted on a 
superfluous level, where symptoms of social and 
political transformation are only linked with the 
conduct of one political actor, and restricted to a 
limited time frame. Nevertheless, the upshot of the 
referendum cannot only be encapsulated in the almost 
eight year reign of the AKP. In order to get a better 
reading on the referendum, one must discuss it in 
relation to the two dynamics that color the patterns of 
Turkish political culture: the formation and 
sustenance of a class-free society  and the prevalence 
of conservatism among all factions, including the 
secular-Kemalist. From this perspective, AKP’s 
continuous victory  in consecutive elections since 
2002 can be explained in terms of Erdogan’s 
exceptional reading of these dynamics, and his 
brilliant utilization of these dynamics in policy 
debates. This, from a rhetorical perspective, is what 
we can conclude as “perennial populism”: the 
defining and distinguishing characteristic of the AKP 
and its leader.
A Populist Democracy?
The AKP benefits from Erdogan’s perennial populism 
in terms of bolstered competence and enhanced will 
for policy-making. Presumably, this competence and 
will for policy  making enables the AKP to come up 
with convincing answers (so convincing to the eyes 
of the voters that they lead to landslide victories in 
each election) to challenging questions (e.g., Turkey’s 
membership in the EU, the Kurdish problem, 
secularization, the status of the Alewite community, 
etc.), thus leading to an expansion of the AKP’s 
political domain. What lies beneath what many 
academics and journalists utter as a democratic 
opening is in fact a pragmatic, and perennial, populist 
policy scheme. With this in mind, Talt’s claim for 
Turkey’s resemblances to Egypt find a stronger 
ground.  
* Oguz Alyanak – The University of Chicago, Social Sciences
** Umit Kurt – Zirve University, International Relations, 
Gaziantep, Turkey
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I would like to share with this short piece a concern 
that several of us in academia in Cairo have been 
facing with the impact of the Arab Spring, to point to 
some frustrations regarding the continuing unequal 
academic relationship  between so-called “local” and 
Western experts of the Middle East, between broadly 
speaking the North and the South (although this 
classification is clearly clichéd), and the reshuffling 
of the international division of labour in the academic 
field whereby inequality  is and will still be 
prevailing.
Without  sounding xenophobic, which is a growing 
concern that personally worries me more than ever, 
there is much to say about the ongoing international 
academic division of labour whereby the divide 
between the so called “theoreticians” of the North and 
the “informants” who are also “objects of study” in 
the South continues to grow.
I am indeed speaking of frustrations because “we” as 
“locals” have been experiencing a situation, time and 
again, of being reduced to becoming at best “service 
providers” for visiting scholars, a term I borrowed 
from my colleague, political scientist  Emad Shahin, 
at worst like the French would put it, as the “indigène 
de service”, for ironically the right cause of the 
revolution. To rather cater for the service of our 
Western expert colleagues who typically make out of 
no more than a week's stay in Cairo, a few shots and a 
tour around Tahrir, the ticket to tag themselves with 
the legitimacy and expertise of first hand knowledge.
It is no secret that the Arab revolutions have revived 
academic interest in the region in a clearly positive 
manner. This is to be certainly  welcomed because it 
has marked a new phase that will possibly  end the 
dreadful misdoings of the 9/11 effect. It  is certainly a 
promising new phase that will hopefully be unmaking 
the evil damage of Bin Laden.
But for the local community of academics, in 
particular what concerns my colleagues at the 
American University in Cairo, many of us have come 
up recently with similar observations. Namely the 
bewilderment at the lavish grants and scholarships 
that many of our Western colleagues have recently 
benefited from to research our beloved revolution. 
Many of us have been bombarded by emails from 
Western colleagues for such service providing.
Now, I do not mean to express any sort of unjustified 
resentment towards our Western colleagues, who 
enjoy  definitively far better conditions regarding 
teaching load, travel allowances and research grants. 
Never mind still, if in the academic international 
division of labour, we as “locals” are still struggling
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to scale up to buy time to undertake research and to 
write. Nevertheless, I think that there is a price to be 
paid for being on the spot of events and for not  being 
at Princeton, Harvard or Oxford universities. Indeed, 
I think that AUC ought to be proud of its younger 
generation of politically and socially  committed 
academics I personally know, and who made a 
conscious choice to return back and live in Cairo and 
work there.
This said, it is no coincidence that  many belonging to 
our scientific community have recently  felt somehow 
“misused” through being overwhelmed by Western 
tourist-revolutionary  academics in search of 
“authentic” Tahrir revolutionaries, needing “service 
providers” for research assistants, for translating, and 
newspaper summaries, for first hand testimonies, and 
time and again as providers of experts and young 
representatives for forthcoming abounding 
conferences on the Arab Spring in the West. 
“Cherchez”, the authentic revolutionary in each 
corner of the city, is the fashionable mood of these 
times. In theory, there is nothing wrong with 
providing services, had the relationship been equal, 
which was unfortunately never the case.
Another point of concern was made clear to me 
through my ongoing dialogue with Emad Shahin who 
pointed to the following issues: the level of 
commitment of some Western academics to their 
subject matter, and the return the region gets on the 
provision of service. Many overnight Middle East 
experts show a remarkable tendency to pursue 
sensational and market-driven topics and readily 
switch interest as the market forces fluctuate. One 
day they are self-proclaimed experts on “political 
Islam” or “Islam and gender” and another, they are 
authority on “the Arab Spring” and “pro-democracy 
revolutions”. This superficial and business-oriented 
handling of crucial developments and changes in the 
area affects how the peoples of the region are 
perceived and how policies are shaped in the West.
Malaysian sociologist S Farid Alatas argued as he 
promoted the idea of the necessity of establishing an 
indigenous sociology through a modern reading of 
the work of Ibn Khaldun and state formation that 
such a move has to be undertaken parallel with the 
rethinking of curricula and syllabi in non-Western 
academic contexts. Furthermore, he argued that  until 
today, textbooks specialising in sociological theory 
reveal a flagrant subject-object contradiction, which 
has been previously highlighted in the debate on 
Orientalism.
Namely, that European thinkers remain pervasively as 
the “knowing subjects” whereas non-Europeans 
continue to be the “objects of observations and 
analyses of European theorists”. Unless these issues 
are not brought up on the table of research agendas I 
am afraid that much will be said in the name of the 
revolution while perpetrating the same inequalities 
and Orientalist attitudes that  are mostly felt in the job 
market, and in evaluating “whose knowledge counts 
more” in academe.
* Reprinted with permission from Mona Abaza. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/22373.aspx
**Mona Abaza is a professor of sociology at the 
American University in Cairo.
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Review of “Islam: To Reform or to 
Subvert” by Mohammed Arkoun 
(Saqi Books, 2006)
Imranali Panjwani*
Mohammed Arkoun’s “Islam: To Reform or to 
Subvert” is arguably  the last book of Arkoun to be 
published in English before his death on September 
14th 2010. His death symbolises a loss in pioneering 
intellectual thought and boldness, particularly  in the 
field of Islamic studies and source interpretation. It is 
therefore all the more significant to analyse this last 
work of his which not only represents a synthesis of 
his previous works (such as Rethinking Islam: 
Common questions, Uncommon answers) but also 
some of his lasting critical thoughts on how the 
revealed and transmitted sources in Islam, namely the 
Qur’an and Sunnah, should be viewed and interpreted 
by scholars and believers alike.
Any review of a book would of course cover the 
author’s main themes and thoughts but I cannot start 
without mentioning Arkoun’s intellectual breadth and 
depth of both Western and Islamic sciences. Arkoun’s 
work can be characterised as anthropological, 
historical and epistemological but what is intriguing 
is his attempt in traversing numerous themes, 
worldviews and subjects. Arkoun appears extremely 
comfortable in quoting pioneers (past  and present) of 
Western philosophy and Orientalism such as Weber, 
Hegel, Kant, Burton, Wansbrough, Schacht and 
Rubin as well as scholars of Islamic sciences such as 
Shafi‛i, Khaldun and Ghazali. For anyone interested 
in Shi‛i scholarship, Arkoun also mentions scholars 
such as Baqir al-Sadr, Khui and Muzaffar, which 
from my own personal reading is rare amongst 
Islamic scholarship  that generally leans toward Sunni 
and/or Sufi interpretations. This in itself shows the 
reader Arkoun’s intellectual and communal 
awareness.
Moreover, Arkoun daringly covers the revelation of 
the Qur’an and its epistemological value and the 
development of classical Islamic scholarship to the 
mindset of ulama (scholars) and political approaches 
to Islam in relation to the Islamic person. He is 
therefore both an insider and outsider to Islamic 
thought. Finally, Arkoun is neither an apologetic or 
modernist — perhaps an appropriate term is a 
‘criticalist’; he equally  criticises Western worldviews 
of Islam as well as Islamic worldviews of the West, 
for example, ‘the book by  Bernard Lewis, entitled 
What Went Wrong?, whose phenomenal sales attests 
to its mass appeal, is an excellent case in point…it 
will suffice to point out that both its title and its 
contents betray  the intellectual impasse born of a 
frame of mind intent on thinking in terms of the 
polarity of an imaginary ‘Islam’ and its equally 
imaginary counterpart of the ‘West.’
SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM & 
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
[31]
So long as this fictional dualism remains in place, the 
intellectual impasse which is thereby engendered is 
destined to remain irresolvable.’(P. 10) He further 
says, ‘the self-promoting West does not even 
integrate in its geopolitical strategies the imposition 
of its world vision and ‘universal’ values, to counter 
the negative or positive perceptions other peoples and 
cultures are developing towards its policy.‘(P. 117)
The book is divided into seven chapters covering the 
following subjects: Qur’anic studies, belief and the 
construction of the subject in Islamic contexts, 
logocentrism and religious truth in Islamic thought, 
authority and power, the concept of the person in 
Islamic tradition, aspects of religious imaginary and 
the rule of law and civil society in Muslim contexts. 
The latter chapter deals with the Crusades and the 
Battle of Lepanto. Arkoun’s intellectual project in this 
book is to demystify and deconstruct the religious 
imaginary  which the majority of Islamic scholars 
(and Western scholars of Islam), Shi‛a or Sunni, have 
operated on for far too long and to challenge the 
reader into thinking about the fundamental questions 
of the purpose of revelation, its relationship to the 
person and its social effects. This is not merely  a 
commentary on reform of Islamic thought but a bold 
attempt in changing the status quo of Islamic thought 
and practice – not just for a renewed interpretation 
but for the very existence of humankind, which 
Arkoun argues is trapped in an anthropological 
triangle of ‘violence, sacred and Truth.’(P. 382)
The first issue Arkoun deals with is the ‘tele-techno-
scientific-reason’ of contemporary Western 
intellectual thought which he calls a ‘purely 
pragmatic, empiricist expertise.’(P. 37) His criticism 
centres on reason as an instrumental venture yielding 
only efficiency and productivity  but without  actually 
answering the ‘unreachable mysteries of the lived 
experiences of the individual.’(p. 41) The 
instrumental nature of reason has been greatly 
criticised by philosophers such as Charles Taylor who 
in his seminal Sources of the Self states:
…much of contemporary 
philosophy has ignored this dimension 
of our moral consciousness and beliefs 
altogether and has even seemed to 
d i s m i s s i t a s c o n f u s e d a n d 
irrelevant...we are dealing here with 
m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s w h i c h a r e 
uncommonly deep, powerful and 
universal. They are so deep  that we are 
tempted to think of them as rooted in 
instinct, in contrast to other moral 
reactions which seem very much the 
consequence of upbringing and 
education. There seems to be a natural, 
inborn compunction to inflict death or 
injury  on another, an inclination to 
come to the help of the injured and 
endangered. Culture and upbringing 
may help to define the boundaries of 
the relevant 'others' but they don't 
seem to create the basic reaction itself. 
That is why eighteenth-century 
thinkers, notably Rousseau, could 
believe in a natural susceptibility to 
feel sympathy for others.(Taylor, Charles. 
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 4-5)
Instead, Arkoun argues for ‘Emerging Reason’ which 
analyzes cognitivity itself ‘so as not to repeat the 
ideological compromises and derivations of the 
p receden t pos tu re s and pe r fo rmances o f 
reason’ (Arkoun, Mohammed. Islam: to Reform or to Subvert 
(Saqi Books, 2006), p. 35) and to fully encompass the 
human condition, including minority voices. At the 
same time, Arkoun argues we must not be overly 
certain about our religious interpretations as this leads 
to irrational orthodoxy, to the detriment of the human 
condition.
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In fact, Arkoun states that even when the sciences of 
usul al-din and usul al-fiqh were developed by 
Muslim theologians and jurists from the 8th century 
onwards, their ‘frameworks were pluralistic and 
conflicting, much less monolithic than what the 
fundamentalist discourse has been imposing for 
several decades.’(p. 56) Moreover, he writes, 
‘European modernity, at least since the eighteenth 
century, has left us with the impression that reason 
could finally be liberated from the constraints of 
dogmatism in order to be placed in the service of 
objective knowledge alone, once a radical separation 
between every institutionalised religious law and the 
“neutral” state has been accomplished.’ (P. 57) 
Arkoun’s aim here is to revitalize Islamic thought 
from its own constraints and admit that its own 
epistemology  was, at one time, dynamic in itself and 
that ‘both trends, Shi‛a and Sunni, never paid serious 
attention to the modern European development of 
philosophy until the nineteenth century.’ (P. 203)
Failing to engage in this exercise leads to a problem 
in narrative, i.e., the creation of idealised 
circumstances, sciences and figures that were correct 
and certain and which forever more will be the 
continual reference point for Islamic interpretation 
and belief. Arkoun’s method of problematising the 
issue of certainty  in reason leads him to consider how 
the Qur’an was revealed and its epistemological 
value today. He argues, similar to Muhammad 
Shahrur, that the Qur’an started as a prophetic 
discourse (not a book) between God, the Prophet 
Muhammad, and the people. It was a lived faith 
experience that operated not only within the milieu of 
other religious traditions but, in particular, in the 
same monotheistic space as Christianity  and Judaism. 
For Arkoun, it appears the Heavenly  message, the 
Book, is the ‘celestial text’ that has been revealed in 
the form of books or ‘societies of the Book-book.’ (P. 
81) His aim is to deconstruct the ‘revealed given’ that 
‘has been received, interpreted and translated into 
ethical, legalistic, political, semantic, aesthetic and 
spiritual codes.’ (P. 81) In this sense, Arkoun puts the 
Qur’an in a much wider epistemological framework 
emanating from the same Heavenly source as other 
revealed books, but which has been greatly shaped by 
historical forces and needs to be viewed as a 
progressive construct.
Here, Arkoun points to a gap in classical Muslim 
scholarship  that has continued up until today. He 
states that ‘Qur’anic scholars had little regard for 
questions of an epistemological nature, if they were 
even aware of them at all.’ (P. 59) This is 
substantiated toward the end of the book in which 
Arkoun quotes from several notable scholars from the 
Shi‛a and Sunni tradition (such as Khui, Khaldun and 
Ghazali) who do not deal with the fundamental 
questions of the Qur’anic discourse and instead treat 
the Qur’an as an enclosed book, full of certainties and 
capable of containing every single aspect of guidance 
for human beings. For Arkoun, the same applies to 
the Sunnah and the fact that this has been elevated to 
a degree that can supersede even the Qur’an itself. It 
is here we come to the biggest problem that Arkoun 
identifies: the ‘Official Closed Corpus.’ (P. 81) This is 
the corpus of books compiled in the 8th through the 
10th centuries; the core books of narration and law 
produced by figures not to be questioned and that 
provide the base narrative of interpreting religion. 
Arkoun mentions the main books of hadith of the 
Shi‛a and Sunni as examples of this, but what is 
intriguing is the gradual formation of imperatives and 
cultural norms by classical scholars which cement 
this idealised narrative, such as the trustworthiness of 
key religious figures in history  or the notion that the 
whole umma would not agree on an error (therefore 
implying their agreement must be truth). This critique 
also includes the ‘most learned exegesis to daily 
liturgical recitation and the spontaneous quoting of 
verses or hadiths in current conversation, in 
controversy or at joyful or sombre events.’ (P. 86)
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For Arkoun, the Official Closed Corpus has resulted 
in the stagnation of interpreting Islamic thought and 
sources for the contemporary  age. This in turn has 
resulted in the narrowing of classical Islamic 
sciences, including theology and law. He says:
the composition, diffusion and 
consecration of the written corpora 
have allowed the setting up of a 
supreme Instance, from which, 
from every community, learned 
ulama draw intangible definitions 
of the ideal conduct and means of 
validation and reactivation of 
orthodox believing…This means 
that the believing experienced 
ignores the distinctions of the 
h i s t o r i a n , s o c i o l o g i s t a n d 
psychologist analyst between the 
Qur’an as a chronological series of 
oral statements, then as the 
Official Closed Corpus, the 
secondary  corpora elaborated by 
the interpreting communities for 
the purpose of integrating into the 
relatively open Corpus of belief 
everything tha t appears as 
innovation, heterogeneous conduct 
(bid‛a) imposed by historical 
evolu t ion or soc io-cul tura l 
diversity. (P. 122)
Arkoun analyzes the epistemology  and methodology 
of the Official Closed Corpus by devoting a large 
section to al-I’lam bi-manaqib al-islam (Exposé of 
the Eminent Qualities of Islam) by Abu al-Hasan 
Amiri (d. 381/992). Here, he shows the logocentrism 
and use of reason in Amiri’s work, which he argues 
was attempting to be dynamic in its own time and 
emphasised the role of reason rather than simply 
following in the footsteps of the ancients. This is a 
valuable section of the book as it exposes Arkoun’s 
use of case studies to cogently  illustrate the kind of 
argumentation used in the classical Islamic period, 
which he supplements with useful diagrams. 
Arkoun’s thrust here is to show how Amiri’s work 
attempted to change the prevailing methodological 
assumptions of the time (but also acknowledges 
Amiri’s limits) and to assert  that Islamic scholars 
today  must do the same. He states, ‘what have we 
gained from our own reading of the I’lam? 
Essentially, an evaluation of the practical efficacy  and 
theoretical inadequacy of philosophical writing in the 
fourth century H./tenth century…The value of al-
Amiri’s demonstration resides in the solid links he 
manages to establish between Revelation and 
history.” (P. 199)
Arkoun then goes on to analyze authority  and power 
within the Islamic tradition. Fundamentally, he argues 
that not only have Islamic ruling authorities stagnated 
scholarship  but that even ulama have failed to grasp 
the ‘historical reasoning about the changing 
epistemological postures of reason in each given 
culture and at each stage of a long historical 
development.’ (P. 205) The result is a collective 
memory or imaginary  in which the political and/or 
scholarly ruling elite exercises power in the name of a 
claimed Truth. The worst aspect is when killing 
occurs with reference to holy cities that exemplify 
this collective imaginary  by the ruling elites, scholars 
and believers alike. Examples also include the 
banning of intellectuals who disagree with the 
‘Iranian Republic, under the leadership  of learned 
authorities who monopolize control of Qur’anic 
interpretation.‘ (P. 372) It is here that Arkoun deals 
with the concept of the person in Islamic tradition by 
examining the relationship between the ‘Qur’anic 
fact’ of God conveying Himself to us and how we 
must respond to Him. Both these chapters act as a 
b r idge be tween the ep i s t emolog ica l and 
methodological chapters early on in the book and 
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relate on a practical level to authority, power and 
personhood.
The final chapters examine the concept of a religious 
imaginary  using two historical case studies – the 
Crusades and the Battle of Lepanto. Here, Arkoun 
aims to show historical conflicts and killings that 
have resulted from creating a problematic narrative of 
religion. Quoting Monsignor Sabbah, Latin Patriarch 
of Jerusalem, Arkoun states, ‘What gives birth to 
religious extremisms and religious wars is not dogma, 
but men who transform dogmas into specific cultures 
and national identities. For if all the faithful limited 
themselves to the effort  to seek God and to adore 
Him, the search for God and his adoration could not 
be the causes of wars, hatred or discrimination.’ (P. 
308) This leads to Arkoun’s final point in the book: 
Humanity has trapped itself in an anthropological 
triangle of violence, the sacred and the Truth.
Overall, I would argue that “Islam: to Reform or to 
Subvert” is an invaluable addition to Islamic 
scholarship, not least because it represents Arkoun’s 
final thoughts in English before his death. The book 
is a rarity and it strikes deep at the heart of the 
intellectual, social and political issues facing Islamic 
scholarship  and Muslims. Scholars and readers alike 
who are looking for an anthropological, historical and 
epistemological contribution with an acute 
understanding of Muslim community issues would 
find this a welcome contribution, along with 
Shahrur’s ‘The Qur’an, Morality and Critical 
Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur.’ 
Arkoun’s real value in this book is his level of 
analysis and scholarly breadth. He understands 
Western and Muslim modes of scholarship and is not 
afraid to ask the boldest of questions about the 
formation and influence of religion. Perhaps this 
following statement sums up his liberating and 
courageous intellectual approach: ‘when confronting 
each other, both sides are intellectually  arrogant. That 
is why I am defending a pluralistic, open 
epistemology  that goes beyond the contradictory 
debates on the one-sided truth, or the right  of each 
individual to hold on to his ‘difference’, without 
caring about the ideological dimensions implicit  in 
each ‘difference’, or ‘identity’ currently  based on 
emotional ties.’ (P. 97)
* Imranali Panjwani is a PhD candidate in Theology 
& Religious Studies, King’s College London. 
jpanjwani@hotmail.com 
Professor Mohammed Arkoun  
(February 1, 1928 – September 14, 2010)




The Sociology of Islam Journal from Brill
Reception at MESA, Washington DC (Dec. 1-4, 2011)
Dear all, 
As you all know, our Sociology of Islam mailing list has grown enormously over the last few years. As of today, 
we have more than 1400 scholars from 413 universities and 37 different countries with a wide range 
of scholarship interests and specializations, from Sociology to International Studies, History, Political Science, 
and Islamic Studies. We have published seven issues of the Sociology of Islam and Muslim Societies Newsletter 
(http://pdx.edu/sociologyofislam/newsletter). The newsletter is written/created from a distinctly  non-Orientalist 
perspective. I must admit that we have faced some challenges from the increased trend of Islamophobia in the 
academic environment in the US; however, as C Wright Mills wrote, "every  time intellectuals have the chance 
to speak yet do not speak, they join the forces that train men not to be able to think and imagine and feel in 
morally and politically adequate ways. When they do not demand that the secrecy  that makes elite decisions 
absolute and unchallengeable be removed, they too are part of the passive conspiracy to kill off public scrutiny. 
When they do not speak, when they  do not demand, when they do not  think and feel and act as intellectuals--
and so as public men--they too contribute to the moral paralysis, the intellectual rigidity, that now grip both 
leaders and led around the world" (The Causes of World War III, 1958, p. 134).   
We are also very excited to announce that our newsletter, the Sociology of Islam and Muslim Societies will be 
published by Brill (http://www.brill.nl/) as a scholarly peer reviewed journal, and in preparation for this 
development, our editorial and advisory board has been updated. There are plans to publish the first issue at the 
end of 2012. 
 
Additionally, we will hold a reception for the Sociology of Islam at the upcoming MESA meeting in 
Washington DC, on December 1-4, 2011. Reception details are as follows, and you will also find information 
about the upcoming reception at the MESA program website:  http://www.mesa.arizona.edu/.  
  The Sociology of Islam Social Gathering at MESA 
  Saturday, December 3, 2011
  Social Gathering, 5-6pm, Jackson Room (Marriott)
You are all invited and we hope to see some of you there.
 
  Salaam to all, 
  Tugrul Keskin 
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